HexBrain

U.S. General Services Administration · Report #1208453

Account takeover through multistage CSRF at https://autochoice.fas.gsa.gov/AutoChoice/changeQAOktaAnswer and ../AutoChoice/changePwOktaAnswer

Validstatus
mediumseverity
33upvotes
23 Jul 2021disclosed

How it was found

Hi,

Account takeover is possible through CSRF vulnerability at 'Change Security Question/Answer' & ' Change Password'. The endpoints - https://autochoice.fas.gsa.gov/AutoChoice/changeQAOktaAnswer & https://autochoice.fas.gsa.gov/AutoChoice/changePwOktaAnswer both are vulnerable to CSRF attack .==The CSRF token/or its presence is not validated at server side.==

Since, the password update functionality requires 'Secret Answer' Value & 'New Password'. Therefore, in multistage CSRF Secret Answer was updated first & then using that new secret answer, new password was set for the account using second stage.

Both CSRF request are performed through the same html POC. Upon execution of POC html, changes will be reflected after few seconds as timeout is set for the first request to complete. Also, there is no need to know the security question either, which itself is updated in the first stage.

POC Video - {F1314428}

CSRF Html file - {F1314439}

@Triage Team - Since, this report involves two CSRFs for different functionalities, should I have filed two different reports ? as I would be losing rep. points.

Impact

Account takeover through CSRF

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original