Brave Software · Report #1347249
Information disclosure
How it was found
Vulnerability tested on:- Brave 1.29.81 Chromium: 93.0.4577.82 (Official Build) (64-bit)
Vulnerability description:- For security measures and for privacy purposes, Brave has the ability to open a normal tab of the Brave when we navigate to: chrome://wallet, chrome://history etc. due to the reason that Tor should be blocking privileged URIs like file:///, chrome:// etc. When we open local storage URIs or the Data URIs, it is blocking. So, we can say that TOR in Brave protects users from opening anything privileged in the browser.
But there is some weird case for: chrome://downloads and brave://inspect/#devices. Both can be dangerous when there is a UXSS present there because it can get to know about the data. The brave://device-log/ looks interesting too, why do we see the device log of brave in the TOR Network in the Brave?
Steps to reproduce:
- Open Brave with TOR
- Navigate to
brave://inspect/#devices
Expected behavior?
--> When we are doing device debugging, it should have opened normal Brave and shouldn't open the privileged URI in the TOR session itself. Open chrome://bookmarks and chrome://history
Actual behavior? --> It opens the debugging session inside the protected tor session.
Suggestions?
--> We should block chrome://downloads, brave://inspect/#devices, brave://device-log/ etc. and when somebody tries to navigate to those URIs, a normal Brave session should be started like we do for chrome://history as it keeps TOR away from personal information inside the brave URIs.
Impact
Information disclosure.