HexBrain

Brave Software · Report #1347249

Information disclosure

N/Astatus
highseverity
2upvotes
21 Sept 2021disclosed

How it was found

Vulnerability tested on:- Brave 1.29.81 Chromium: 93.0.4577.82 (Official Build) (64-bit) Vulnerability description:- For security measures and for privacy purposes, Brave has the ability to open a normal tab of the Brave when we navigate to: chrome://wallet, chrome://history etc. due to the reason that Tor should be blocking privileged URIs like file:///, chrome:// etc. When we open local storage URIs or the Data URIs, it is blocking. So, we can say that TOR in Brave protects users from opening anything privileged in the browser. But there is some weird case for: chrome://downloads and brave://inspect/#devices. Both can be dangerous when there is a UXSS present there because it can get to know about the data. The brave://device-log/ looks interesting too, why do we see the device log of brave in the TOR Network in the Brave?

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Open Brave with TOR
  2. Navigate to brave://inspect/#devices

Expected behavior? --> When we are doing device debugging, it should have opened normal Brave and shouldn't open the privileged URI in the TOR session itself. Open chrome://bookmarks and chrome://history

Actual behavior? --> It opens the debugging session inside the protected tor session.

Suggestions? --> We should block chrome://downloads, brave://inspect/#devices, brave://device-log/ etc. and when somebody tries to navigate to those URIs, a normal Brave session should be started like we do for chrome://history as it keeps TOR away from personal information inside the brave URIs.

Impact

Information disclosure.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original