HexBrain

LinkedIn · Report #1572591

Privilege Escalation - "Analyst" Role Can View Email Domains of a Company - [GET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings]

Validstatus
mediumseverity
48upvotes
26 Aug 2022disclosed

How it was found

Summary:

Hey team, During the security assessment, I came across an endpoint - GET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings, which is vulnerable to privilege escalation. A lower privileged user can abuse this to view the list of approved domains for email verification even though it can't be accessed directly from the UI.

Vulnerable HTTP Request:

GET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings?decorationId=com.linkedin.voyager.dash.deco.organization.FullOrganizationEmailDomainMapping-2&company=urn%3Ali%3Afsd_company%3A81541206&count=100&q=organization&start=0 HTTP/2
Host: www.linkedin.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0
Accept: application/vnd.linkedin.normalized+json+2.1
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Restli-Protocol-Version: 2.0.0
Dnt: 1
Referer: https://www.linkedin.com/company/81541206/admin/manage-admins/
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Te: trailers
Cookie: REDACTED
Csrf-Token: REDACTED

Steps to Reproduce:

  • Go to https://www.linkedin.com/ and log in to your test account.
  • Go to "Me" and click on your company under the "Manage" section.

{F1732479}

  • Go to "Admin Tools" > "Employee Verification"

{F1732480}

  • Intercept the vulnerable HTTP request.
  • Change all the values of the cookie parameters & CSRF token to that of a lower privileged user ("Analyst" role). The response will disclose the approved domain for verification.

{F1732484}

PoC:

  • Have a look at the video here:

{F1732486}

Impact

A lower privileged user can abuse this to view the list of approved domains for email verification even though it can't be accessed directly from the UI.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original