LinkedIn · Report #1961163
CSRF that makes any user send invitations to the attacker by simply clicking on a link.
Validstatus
mediumseverity
41upvotes
6 Dec 2023disclosed
Summary
The researcher found a CSRF issue that allowed targeted links (intended and usable only by a single member) to send connection invitations once clicked on without any prompt/intermediary step to confirm such action. Thank you @marvelmaniac for the report!
The PoC link was as follows -
https://www.linkedin.com/comm/mynetwork/send-invite/<USERNAME>/?lipi=urn:li:page:email_email_pymk_02;3MPU3ZpvSH6FxK37sN6PTA==&midSig=1H88TLaeqmRWI1&midToken=AQGOWzyQBc3Qug&trkEmail=eml-email_pymk_02-pymkCard-0-cta-null-h3akrx~lguw0uex~xs-null-null&trk=eml-email_pymk_02-pymkCard-0-cta&_sig=0y-j3QtmmmRWI1
Here the <username> is the Public Profile URL name. It was possible to make any user send connection invites to ourselves by simply providing them with the above crafted link.
How it was found
The write-up for this report has not been downloaded yet, or the program disclosed it without one. Read it on HackerOne.