HexBrain

LinkedIn · Report #1961163

CSRF that makes any user send invitations to the attacker by simply clicking on a link.

Validstatus
mediumseverity
41upvotes
6 Dec 2023disclosed

Summary

The researcher found a CSRF issue that allowed targeted links (intended and usable only by a single member) to send connection invitations once clicked on without any prompt/intermediary step to confirm such action. Thank you @marvelmaniac for the report!

The PoC link was as follows -

https://www.linkedin.com/comm/mynetwork/send-invite/<USERNAME>/?lipi=urn:li:page:email_email_pymk_02;3MPU3ZpvSH6FxK37sN6PTA==&midSig=1H88TLaeqmRWI1&midToken=AQGOWzyQBc3Qug&trkEmail=eml-email_pymk_02-pymkCard-0-cta-null-h3akrx~lguw0uex~xs-null-null&trk=eml-email_pymk_02-pymkCard-0-cta&_sig=0y-j3QtmmmRWI1

Here the <username> is the Public Profile URL name. It was possible to make any user send connection invites to ourselves by simply providing them with the above crafted link.

How it was found

The write-up for this report has not been downloaded yet, or the program disclosed it without one. Read it on HackerOne.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original