HexBrain

Ford · Report #484420

Subdomain takeover on usclsapipma.cv.ford.com

Validstatus
highseverity
105upvotes
24 Mar 2019disclosed

How it was found

Hello Ford H1 team,

I want to report a Subdomain takeover vulnerability in this report, a pretty serious security issue in some context.

Overview:

One of the ford.com subdomains is pointing to Azure, which has unclaimed CNAME record. ANYONE is able to own ford.com subdomain at the moment.

This vulnerability is called subdomain takeover. You can read more about it here:

https://blog.sweepatic.com/subdomain-takeover-principles/ https://labs.detectify.com/tag/hostile-subdomain-takeover/ https://hackerone.com/reports/325336

Details:

usclsapipma.cv.ford.com has CNAME usclsapipma.trafficmanager.net wich has a CNAME to feuscspma3fcvapi.eastus.cloudapp.azure.com. However, feuscspma3fcvapi.eastus.cloudapp.azure.com is not registered in Azure cloudapp Virtual machine anymore and thus can be registered as FQDN for a easus VM by anyone. After registering the Cloud App Virtual Machine in Azure portal, the person doing so has full control over traffic on dynatraceppeast01.cf.ford.com (so, not only HTTP/HTTPS but also mails traffic, etc, since we have full control over the virtual machine and it's OS).

Mitigation:

Remove the CNAME record from ford.com DNS zone completely. OR Claim it back in Azure portal

Files :

Azure-check-availability.png -> Screenshot of the Azure website api "check availability" for the "eastus" cloudapp virtual machine. on the link, you can see the location "eastus" part of the fqdn ad the DomainNameLabel "feuscspma3fcvapi" part of the FQDN, and the "available : true" response for this fqdn. dns-proof.png -> Result of a "dig" command for this domains, showing the "NXDOMAIN" reponse for the CNAME entry of the ford subdomain.

Cheers,

March_42

Impact

Subdomain takeover can be abused to do several things like :

Malware distribution Phishing / Spear phishing XSS Authentication bypass Legitimate mail sending and receiving on behalf of ford subdomain ... List goes on and on.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original