HexBrain

Uber · Report #707748

Subdomain takeover on mta1a1.spmail.uber.com

Validstatus
mediumseverity
30upvotes
6 Apr 2020disclosed

Summary

A dangling AWS record on mta1a1.spmail.uber.com allowed a complete DNS zone takeover, giving an adversary access to mta1a1.spmail.uber.com-scoped cookies and CORS, which could facilitate phishing attacks.

Thanks again, @0x3c3e!

It's so called IP-use-after-free attack. I was able to obtain an IP address from mta1a1.spmail.uber.com A DNS record as it was possible to allocate the IP from AWS elastic IP's pool.

Edit 11/2019 - It would appear AWS has begun serving elastic IPs from a small account-specific pool (similar to GCP). This severly limits the diversity of addresses recieved. (from https://github.com/monoxgas/FlyingAFalseFlag).

As follows from the foregoing, current chances to reproduce something like that should tend to zero.

References

How it was found

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