HexBrain

Kubernetes · Report #794382

Route53 Subdomain Takeover on test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io

Duplicatestatus
highseverity
13upvotes
16 Jan 2021disclosed

How it was found

Summary:

I discovered that it was possible to takeover test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io by assigning a zone to that name with one of the following nameservers in Route53:

test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io. 3600 IN    NS      ns-265.awsdns-33.com.
test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io. 3600 IN    NS      ns-687.awsdns-21.net.
test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io. 3600 IN    NS      ns-1458.awsdns-54.org.
test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io. 3600 IN    NS      ns-1825.awsdns-36.co.uk.

Once the zone was claimed, I was able to create DNS records under this host. Consider the following record:

poc.test-cncf-aws.canary.k8s.io

Steps To Reproduce:

  1. See above domain

Remediation Instructions

Remove the NS record delegation NS privs on a subdomain before you delete the zone

Impact

With this vulnerability, an attacker can host arbitrary content under your domain. This can allow an attacker to host brand-damaging materials, steal sensitive * scoped session cookies, and even escalate other vulnerabilities.

This report was disclosed publicly on HackerOne and belongs to its author and the program. See the original